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Mo9va9on	  
•  Enormous	  number	  of	  new	  malware	  samples	  
each	  day	  requires	  automated	  analysis	  
•  Malware	  needs	  kernel-­‐mode	  privileges	  to	  
provide	  powerful	  func9onality	  (e.g.	  Rootkits)	  
– Stealth	  
–  Informa9on	  gathering	  
•  Aspect	  of	  device	  driver	  behavior	  has	  received	  
less	  a:en9on	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Our	  Approach	  
•  Run	  malware	  in	  an	  emulated	  environment	  
•  Monitor	  and	  evaluate	  analysis	  events	  
– Executed	  code	  
– Manipulated	  memory	  
•  Reconstruct	  high-­‐level	  seman9cs	  
•  Generate	  human-­‐readable	  analysis	  report	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Process	  vs.	  Driver	  
Process	   Driver	  
Execu.on	  context	   separate	  for	  each	  process	   same	  as	  kernel	  
View	  on	  memory	   unique	  page	  table	  directory	   kernel	  memory	  space	  
Func.onality	   limited	  through	  well-­‐deﬁned	  













DIMVA	  2010	  –	  7th	  Conference	  on	  
Detec9on	  of	  Intrusions	  and	  Malware	  &	  Vulnerability	  Assessment	  
Rootkit:	  Goals	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Inject	  code	  into	  the	  kernel	  
Provide	  stealth	   Gather	  sensi9ve	  informa9on	  
Communicate	  with	  
user	  mode	  applica9on	  • 	  Use	  a	  kernel	  exploit	  
• 	  Load	  a	  device	  driver	   • 	  Use	  device	  communica9on	  
• 	  Reroute	  kernel	  control	  ﬂow	  
• 	  Tamper	  with	  kernel	  data	  structures	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Scenario:	  Process	  hiding	  
Applica9on	  issues	  system	  call	  to	  list	  processes	  
Kernel	  system	  call	  dispatcher	  looks	  up	  system	  call	  
in	  call	  table	  
Kernel	  calls	  NtEnumerateProcess	  
NtEnumerateProcess	  retrieves	  informa9on	  from	  
double-­‐linked	  kernel	  process	  list	  
Informa9on	  is	  returned	  to	  applica9on	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Scenario:	  File	  hiding	  
Applica9on	  issues	  system	  call	  to	  list	  ﬁles	  in	  a	  
directory	  
Kernel	  system	  call	  dispatcher	  looks	  up	  system	  call	  
in	  call	  table	  
Kernel	  calls	  NtQueryDirectoryFile	  
NtQueryDirectoryFile	  requests	  informa9on	  from	  
the	  disk	  device	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Overview	  
•  Dynamic	  analysis	  of	  Windows	  device	  drivers	  
•  Virtual	  machine	  introspec9on	  using	  Qemu	  
•  Derive	  high-­‐level	  seman9cs	  of	  observed	  analysis	  
events	  
•  Provide	  driver	  context	  informa9on	  for	  observed	  
analysis	  events	  
•  Perform	  ﬁrst	  large	  scale	  study	  of	  kernel	  malware	  
behavior	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dAnubis	  
•  Detect	  introduc9on	  of	  unknown	  device	  drivers	  
•  Keep	  track	  of	  driver	  state	  
•  Analyse	  
– Generic	  behavioral	  aspects	  (e.g.	  called	  kernel	  
func9ons)	  
– Known	  typical	  Rootkit	  behavior	  (e.g.	  system	  call	  
table	  hooks)	  
– Licit	  OS	  -­‐	  device	  driver	  interac9on	  (e.g.	  device	  
communica9on)	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Challenges	  
•  Bridging	  the	  seman9c	  gap	  
–  Loss	  of	  seman9c	  informa9on	  when	  looking	  at	  memory	  
from	  outside	  
–  Reestablish	  informa9on	  by	  guest-­‐view	  cas9ng	  
–  Obtain	  necessary	  informa9on	  from	  debugging	  symbols	  
•  Tracking	  and	  a:ribu9ng	  kernel-­‐mode	  events	  
–  Code	  runs	  in	  arbitrary	  context	  
–  Iden9fy	  event	  origin	  based	  on	  current	  program	  counter	  
–  Exact	  loca9on	  of	  driver	  codebase	  in	  memory	  has	  to	  be	  
known	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Device	  Driver	  Analysis	  
•  Intercept	  lowest-­‐level	  loading	  mechanisms	  
– Get	  codebase	  loca9on	  
– Get	  oﬀsets	  of	  the	  driver’s	  exported	  func9ons	  
•  Perform	  state-­‐tracking	  
– Assign	  analysis	  events	  to	  a	  driver’s	  context	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Device	  Driver	  Analysis	  
•  Monitor	  driver	  ac9vity	  
– Record	  calls	  to	  exported	  Windows	  kernel	  func9ons	  
– Taint	  string	  occurrences	  in	  the	  driver	  image	  
•  Monitor	  driver	  communica9on	  
– Crea9on	  of	  devices	  and	  a:aching	  to	  driver	  stacks	  
–  Intercep9ng	  IRP	  traﬃc	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Device	  Driver	  Interac9on	  
•  Devices	  as	  communica9on	  endpoints	  
•  Stacking	  of	  drivers	  for	  complex	  processing	  
15	  
Applica9on	   I/O	  System	  










I/O	  Request	  Packet	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Memory	  Analysis	  
•  Put	  certain	  memory	  regions	  under	  supervision	  
– Kernel	  objects	  for	  process	  and	  driver	  bookkeeping	  
– System	  call	  table	  
– Kernel	  module	  codebases	  
•  Track	  down	  and	  evaluate	  manipula9ons	  
– Targets	  of	  call	  table	  manipula9ons	  
– Consequences	  of	  kernel	  object	  manipula9on	  
– Detour	  patches	  of	  exis9ng	  kernel	  code	  in	  memory	  
•  Determine	  which	  kernel	  func9on	  has	  been	  patched	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S9mula9on	  
•  Rootkit	  func9onality	  depends	  on	  external	  
s9muli,	  e.g.	  
– Keystrokes	  for	  keylogging	  
– Process	  enumera9on	  for	  process-­‐hiding	  
•  S9mulator	  component	  in	  the	  VM	  that	  
repeatedly	  issues	  API	  calls	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Evalua9on	  
•  Small	  evalua9on	  with	  samples	  from	  
www.rootkit.com	  to	  verify	  func9onality	  
•  Large-­‐scale	  study	  
– 64733	  samples	  analyzed	  by	  Anubis	  in	  August	  2009	  
– 463	  of	  these	  called	  NtLoadDeviceDriver	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Results:	  High-­‐level	  Ac9vity	  
Driver	  ac.vity	   Number	  of	  samples	  exhibi.ng	  behavior	  
Device	  driver	  loaded	   463	  
Windows	  kernel	  func9ons	  used	   360	  
Windows	  device	  IO	  used	   339	  
Strings	  accessed	   300	  
Kernel	  code	  patched	   76	  
Kernel	  call	  tables	  manipulated	   37	  
MDL	  allocated	   34	  
Kernel	  object	  manipulated	   3	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Results:	  Device	  Ac9vity	  
Device	  ac.vity	   Number	  of	  samples	  
Device	  created	   339	  
Driver’s	  device	  accessed	  from	  user	  mode	   110	  
Driver‘s	  device	  invoked	  from	  user	  mode	   86	  
Strings	  detected	  during	  communica9on	   24	  
A:aches	  to	  device	  stack	   2	  
Registers	  comple9on	  rou9ne	   2	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Example	  Report	  A	  
Driver	  name	   syssrv	  
Created	  devices	   \Device\MyDriver	  
Rootkit	  ac9vity	   NtEnumerateKey	   SSDT	  Hook	  
NtQueryDirectoryFile	   SSDT	  Hook	  
svchost.exe	   DKOM	  process	  hidden	  
Invoked	  major	  func9ons	   CREATE	   5x	  from	  user	  mode	  
DEVICE_CONTROL	   5x	  from	  user	  mode	  
CLOSE	   5x	  from	  kernel	  mode	  
Used	  strings	   \WINDOWS\system32\mssrv32.exe	   in	  DEVICE_CONTROL	  IRP	  
\SOFTWARE\...	  \CurrentVersion\Run
\mssrv32	  
in	  DEVICE_CONTROL	  IRP	  
Used	  kernel	  func9ons	   ObReferenceObjectByName	   during	  DEVICE_CONTROL	  	  
PsLookupProcessByProcessID	   during	  DEVICE_CONTROL	  	  
NtEnumerateKey	   during	  NtEnumerateKey	  hook	  
wcslen,	  wcspz,	  wcscat	   during	  NtEnumerateKey	  hook	  
NtQueryDirectoryFile	   during	  NtQueryDirectoryFile	  hook	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Example	  Report	  B	  
Driver	  name	   FILEMON701	  
Created	  devices	   \Device\Filemon701	  
two	  unnamed	  devices	  
A:ached	  to	  devices	   sr	  
MRxSMB	  
Comple9on	  rou9ne	   QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION	  for	  device	  sr	  
Invoked	  major	  func9ons	   CREATE	   from	  user	  mode	  
QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION	   from	  kernel	  mode	  
READ	   from	  kernel	  mode	  
CLEANUP,	  CLOSE	   from	  kernel	  mode	  
FastIoDeviceControl	  
Used	  kernel	  func9ons	   IoCreateDevice	   during	  entry	  
IoGetCurrentProcess	   during	  entry	  
IoCreateDevice	   during	  FastIoControl	  
IoA:achDeviceByPointer	   during	  FastIoControl	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Conclusions	  and	  Outlook	  
•  dAnubis	  can	  provide	  a	  substan9al	  amount	  of	  
informa9on	  on	  kernel-­‐side	  malware	  
•  Large	  scale	  analysis	  has	  given	  interes9ng	  ﬁrst	  
insight	  in	  the	  kernel-­‐side	  malware	  landscape	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